On Wednesday we’ll hear whether Dwain Chambers has managed to get an injunction lifting his Olympic ban for drug cheating offences. I’ve no sympathy at all with Chambers – it’ll be a depressing day if he does manage to win, and will make the Olympics even less worth watching than it will be anyway.

But if like me you’re interested in how his legal argument runs, have a look at this Times article from the other week which suggests his claim may combine public and private law arguments, the argument being (a) that the British Olympic Committee, in imposing a lifetime Olympic ban on drugs cheats, has gone beyond the harmonized sanctions laid down in the World Anti-Doping Agency’s Code and is therefore beyond the BOA’s powers; and (2) that the lifetime ban amounts to an unjustified restraint of Chambers’s trade and so is an unenforceable term in the contract between them and him. There’s also this post from March on the Global Administrative Law blog from NYU Law School which is the best summary I’ve seen of the issues.

Here’s the BOA’s “eligibility bye law” that’s being questioned, and the WADA Code: article 10.2 is the key provision.

I’m not going to give a view on the merits, but I do think all this points to unnecessary weakness in global anti-doping rules. Why on earth anyone should think a two-year ban is sufficient, I have no idea; it seems to me obvious that drugs cheats should be banned from sport for life. But if WADA and its members even accepted my view as a reasonable one, then the Code ought to contain clear provisions permitting national associations from imposing stricter sanctions than those in the Code. Finally, I think the BOA has been silly in accepting a rule-based approach to who it must select, based on who wins the trials. If it had retained discretion, then it could choose not to select Chambers even if he weren’t subject to a ban.

2008-07-14T11:28:00+00:00Tags: , |