Extremely likely to be including, because to leave out such a clause would be to leave an obvious risk of a consitutional crisis.

“It seems to me that to do so would actually defeat the purpose of the 55% rule.”

It is certainly possible that Tories were wrongly reassured by the idea that this gave them an advantage – they haven’t spent as long pondering electoral reform as the Lib Dems. My reading is that the Lib Dems put one over on them, and now all these silly people whinging about the 55% rule are forcing that minor deception out into the open.

All you need to do to make this legislation watertight is add in a 28 day cut off – since the immediate precedent of the Scots parliament, which Labour passed, has this clause it seems fatuous to leap to the conclusion it won’t be in the Westminster version, simply because a very brief reference in the coalition document didn’t spell this out.

‘A much better way of achieving what I think the coalition wants is a public agreement that a 51% majority in Parliament must agree before the PM could seek a dissolution from the Queen – arguably creating a new constitutional convention about dissolution.’

– did you mean 51%? Why a percentage? This is still as bad and as arbitrary as 55% – 51% is half of Parliament plus 6 and a half votes! I want the current system – a majority means half the house plus one.

The coalition agreement document is not a Bill. It is not intended to be. It is intended to outline the areas of consensus whereby the coalition partners can set out a legislative programme. It is, in effect, a new manifesto – and it is in the nature of manifestos that they do not go into excruciating detail; when the details are fleshed out, the proposal becomes more concrete, and we subsequently get a Bill that is subject to critical scrutiny by both houses of Parliament and the public – then we’ll know precisely what we’re dealing with.

So it’s not a case of “It’ll be alright on the night”. It’s a case of “We don’t even have a script yet”. I don’t think it’s “optimistic” to say that I wish to see the actual text of the Bill so that I can come to an informed judgement. And I would put it to you, conversely, that the assumption that Parliament would pass a Bill providing for fixed-term Parliaments, having taken no account whatsoever of existing practices in Parliaments and assemblies either within the UK or elsewhere, would be cynicism of the highest order.
.-= Keith´s last blog ..The 55% rule: a storm in a teacup? =-.

[...] Yes, others could try to form a minority coalition. There are several possibilities. But one and only one option would be excluded, without Conservative support, and it’s the most democratic one, i.e. an election.

How do you feel this situation would be any different from present, i.e. it being the royal prerogative, reserved to the PM? Surely that option would be technically excluded now?

Even if the 55% couldn’t be removed by a simple majority I think it would be political suicide for any Party to sit in the House of Commons actively blocking an election that was being called for by a majority of MPs.

I see one fundamental difference between a vote of no confidence (>50%) and a vote to dissolve Parliament (>55%). The former comes when Parliament has lost faith in the government – the latter could come if the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives decided to call an election, but not if only one of them did.

In that respect, it is not really a measure to introduce added democracy but to make concrete what would otherwise be a mere promise from the Conservatives to the Lib Dems.

Whether it is acceptable to fiddle with the constitution to make stable the coalition is perhaps another question, which I am not settled on as yet.

Nigel
.-= Nigel Brook´s last blog ..Cooperation Politics =-.

I don’t think that’s what Lee’s saying at all. What’s being said is that the fine print of the proposal has not yet been published, and a fair number of people seem to be assuming the worst – first it was touted as an alteration of the no-confidence rule (it isn’t), then there’s this bizarre claim by Carl that a “progressive coalition … could not seek a mandate without Conservative agreement, even if it wanted to” (actually it could; any coalition could be formed if it could command the confidence of sitting MPs, which merely requires a simple majority, or even a minority if enough MPs abstain).

It would also seem, given Carl’s later submission to Radio 4′s PM programme in which he dismisses criticism of his position as “spin”, that he has set his face against this proposal, no matter what the fine details might be. That is unfortunate.

Pointing out that people are leaping to conclusions based on a whole raft of assumptions is not “spin”, nor is it a case of demanding “deference”. When the Bill is eventually published, we will all be able to examine its provisions and assess its merits. That is the sensible thing to do. Leaping to completely unwarranted conclusions based on a paucity of information is not, and accusing others of “spin” when they point out that simple truth is not a particularly helpful contribution to the discussion. If the Bill turns out to be a pig’s breakfast, I’ll happily join Carl in opposing it. I am not going to prejudge it before I’ve seen it.

Carl then says “When you take all this in, you realise that the distinction between a no confidence vote and a vote for dissolution is a vanishing one.”

That is, if and only if Carl’s worst fears were to come true (that a Bill on fixed-term Parliaments would contain no provisions whatsoever for escaping from a legislative deadlock), and if one accepts Carl’s erroneous notion that the Conservatives were in a position to prevent any other coalition from being formed, then we end up with either a coalition or a Conservative minority Government until 2015, come what may.

I think it’s fair to point out that there needs to be provisions for resolving legislative deadlock.

But I do not accept that such provisions would amount to having no fixed-term Parliaments at all (only Norway and Switzerland have “absolute” fixed-term Parliaments, as far as I am aware); and I do not consider it at all obvious that one should leap to the conclusion that a Bill would not contain any such provisions, purely on the basis that the coalition agreement document does not go into fine detail. The coalition agreement document does not go into the fine details of any measure; that is not its purpose. That is what a Bill is for, and a Bill will be brought before the House in due course.

Further, we have the precedent of the Scotland Act 1998, which may well serve as a template for any measure applied to Westminster. It is not as if these issues have not been considered and resolved before. They have. Why Carl would assume that a future Bill involving fixed terms for Westminster would totally ignore what has gone before, frankly baffles me.

If one is against fixed-term Parliaments, that’s fine. But let’s not pretend that a proposal that would allow Parliament to dissolve itself with a supermajority of 55% is any less democratic than the current situation, where a single MP (the Prime Minister) is able to dissolve Parliament at whim. Whether it’s 50%+1, 55% or 66⅔%, the principle is that it is our representatives on the floor of the House, and *not* the Prime Minister, who will determine when Parliament is dissolved, and it is they who will have to go back and justify their vote to their electors.

It does rather seem as if the no-to-55% lobby, having been caught out by a glaring error the BBC made yesterday (which is understandable – who wouldn’t trust the BBC to report facts accurately after all?), is now back-pedalling, desperately looking for something in this proposal with which to disagree.
.-= Keith´s last blog ..The 55% rule: a storm in a teacup? =-.

I agree that there is some doubt as to the position if a government were to be opposed by between 50% and 55% of Parliament. I am certain that the political reality is that the Prime Minister would resign while Parliament continued but it is a bit murky as to whether a resignation could be forced. This problem is very far from insoluble and does not affect the principle.

Placing a restriction only on the power of the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament is not good enough. The primary goal of fixed-term parliaments is not to prevent dissolution in favourable circumstances but to encourage long-term thinking, especially in economic policy, a particularly pressing issue at the moment. Rewarding governments for periods of unprecedented growth is like paying bonuses to bankers. If the detractors are correct and cracks start to appear in the coalition, we do not want the Treasury to have the threat of a possible election in mind when it is making difficult decisions.

There is only one of the aims of the Chartists that has not been adopted and that is their demand for annual general elections. There is a reason for this.
.-= James Medhurst´s last blog ..Reformulating claims =-.