One of the strangest aspects of the MP’s expenses scandal has been the way politicians have tried to move public discussion on to questions of sweeping constitutional reform. It seems to me it was the greed of MPs themselves – though not all of them, of course – and the laxness of the system they created for themselves, that caused this abuse of public funds, and that it was the attempt by some of them, including the Speaker, to cover up the abuse that has made public anger even worse. Nothing about it points to the need for deep constitutional reform.

That doesn’t mean the ideas people are floating don’t have merit: some of them certainly do.

But an idea I’m definitely not in favour of is one David Cameron has now said he’ll consider: fixed-term Parliaments. The first thing to say about this is that it’s entirely at odds with Cameron’s desire for there to be a general election now. This contradiction in itself seems to me to make David Cameron’s new suggestion laughable. But I’m not for it on its merits, either.

We already have fixed-term Parliaments in the sense that Parliament has a fixed maximum term, under the Septennial Act 1715 (a silly bit of drafting, that – surely the 1715 Act ought to have been repealed and replaced, rather than simply amended). Parliament lasts a maximum of five years. What the reformers mean of course is that the Prime Minister should no longer have power to ask the Queen for a dissolution within five years, or a shortened four-year term.

But if you applied that rule strictly, as in David Howarth’s bill, then Parliament could not be dissolved (see clause 2(4)), and no new election could be held, even if a government lost its majority and was defeated in a vote of confidence. If the government resigned, a new administration would have to be formed by the opposition, or by a coalition of parties, without there being any possibility of the public having their say in a general election. Nothing could be less democratic. Britain would suffer either from lame-duck governments, staggering on but not governing, in a Parliament unable either to legislate or dissolve itself, or else from an even worse evil, changes of government without general elections. People complain enough about Gordon Brown becoming PM without holding an election soon after; what they’d say about getting David Cameron without an election, I don’t know.

So, some people say, we must have an exception in the event of a government losing a confidence vote. In those circumstances, the PM would be able to ask for a dissolution. Well, all right. But then the government would simply be able to vote itself out of office, as Gerhard Schröder’s red-green coalition did in Germany in 2005, whenever it thought an election convenient. The exception would ride a coach and horses through the rule.

So you can’t really ensure power changes hands by elections, and remove the PM’s power to cut and run. Is there anything in the idea simply of reducing Parliaments to four-year terms in place of the current five years? I don’t think so. British government is short-termist enough as it is. I wouldn’t want to exacerbate that problem by forcing a shorter time-horizon on it.

Really, what most people mean at the moment when they talk about fixed-term Parliaments is that they think after four years, this government’s had it and they want an election now. Well, if people want Labour out, they need to vote for someone else on June 4 – and hope to force a crisis at the top of government. Or else simply wait for the chance to sack ministers next year.

What makes no sense is to say that the inability to force an early election on Gordon Brown now means we should remove the possibility of an early general election ever being held in future.

2009-05-28T16:57:00+00:00Tags: , , |