In our latest Without Prejudice podcast, Charon QC, David Allen Green and I discuss –
- the government’s draft Defamation Bill, currently subject to consultation;
- superinjunctions, so-called “hyperinjunctions” and all that, plus MPs’ use of Parliamentary privilege;
- the Supreme Court’s removal of immunity for expert witnesses in civil proceedings in its Jones v Kaney judgment last week (and why should judges be immune from being sued?);
- the ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Lautsi v Italy, in effect restoring the right of Italy to require crucifixes to be displayed in classrooms;
- miscarriages of justice, Lord Denning and the landmark BBC programme Rough Justice, and
- whether mini-pupillages are part of the current internship culture.
A really packed discussion, then – and a good one. Certainly interesting to take part in – and I hope to listen to, too.
Interesting as ever. A couple of stray thoughts.
On the liability of judges, we do of course have Kobler, where the ECJ said that national courts could be liable for flagrant breaches of EU law (although in Cooper the Court of Appeal said that a successful claim would be very rare).
And on Denningite tendencies in the modern judiciary, what about the decision of the House of Lords in Connor and Mirza? The majority held that it was not appropriate for an appeal court to look behind a jury’s decision, even if there was strong evidence that the jury had followed a fundamentally wrong process. So the public interest in reversing a miscarriage of justice apparently takes second place to the need to preserve public confidence in juries.
Interesting as ever. A couple of stray thoughts.
On the liability of judges, we do of course have Köbler, where the ECJ said that national courts could be liable for flagrant breaches of EU law (although in Cooper v AG the Court of Appeal said that a successful claim would be very rare).
And on Denningite tendencies in the modern judiciary, what about the decision of the House of Lords in Connor and Mirza? The majority held that it was not appropriate for an appeal court to look behind a jury’s decision, even if there was strong evidence that the jury had followed a fundamentally wrong process. So the public interest in reversing a miscarriage of justice apparently takes second place to the need to preserve public confidence in juries.