A day after the Court of Appeal refused her permission to appeal to the Supreme Court in the Abu Qatada case, Theresa May’s announcement today of a mutual legal assistance treaty with Jordan seems finally to turn the case in her favour. Here is the treaty:

The Court of Appeal had upheld the Special Immigration Appeals Commission’s decision that the Home Secretary was wrong in law to insist on her most recent decision to deport Abu Qatada to Jordan (where he faces criminal charges) because there remains a real risk that evidence obtained by torture will be used against him there. This, the European Court of Human Rights ruled last year, would be a “flagrant denial of justice” and therefore a breach of the right to a fair trial enshrined in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Home Secretary might yet get permission from the Supreme Court itself for an appeal (although perhaps that’s less likely now, since the prospect of the treaty coming into force may make the current legal position, in Supreme Court justices’ view, of less general public importance than it seemed only yesterday). But any appeal would probably have been hopeless. In reality, SIAC was loyally applying the principles laid down by the European Court, which it was bound to take account of under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Theresa May’s real problem has been this: that in spite of various guarantees and legal changes she argues she had obtained from Jordan, both SIAC and the Court of Appeal concluded that there’s a real risk under Jordanian law that the Jordanian courts would use evidence against Abu Qatada about which, in the Court of Appeal’s words (see para. 49),

the ECtHR made strong findings as to the compelling nature of the evidence that the statements had in fact been obtained by torture.

None of the guarantees she has been able to point to have been enough to create confidence that the evidence will be excluded. That has been the essence of the problem. Until now.

Article 27.4 of the Treaty is the key: if Abu Qatada’s surrender to Jordan is requested under the new, in effect, extradition arrangements established by article 26, then under article 27.4

Where, before the date of signature of this Treaty, a Court in the sending
State has found that there is a real risk that a statement from a person has been
obtained by torture or ill-treatment by the authorities of the receiving State, and might be used in a criminal trial in the receiving State referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, this statement shall not be submitted by the prosecution nor admitted by the Court in the receiving State, unless the prosecution in the receiving State proves beyond any doubt that the statement has been provided out of free-will and choice and was not obtained by torture or ill-treatment by the authorities of the receiving State, and the Court in the receiving State is so satisfied.

It’s worth noting that this would not only put the burden of proof on the Jordanian prosecution to prove that any statement it relies on in evidence against Abu Qatada was provided freely and not obtained by ill-treatment; it would also require proof to a very high standard indeed – beyond any doubt. This is a very strong provision, and in my view it’s a game-changer for Theresa May.

The remaining questions are, how quickly the treaty can be ratified and brought into effect by the two countries (there’s little doubt Parliament will be able to approve a bill enabling its ratification very quickly), and whether the courts here – and the European Court – will accept the treaty as giving sufficient assurance that the alleged torture evidence will not be used.

I think the courts here and in Strasbourg probably will accept it. Applying the sort of approach set out by the European Court to assurances on the use of torture itself in last years Abu Qatada judgment (see para. 189), it seems to me this treaty passes the test since it contains guarantees that on their face seem effective, that are public, legally binding and made in the context of strong bilateral UK-Jordanian relations. Plus, by the time the case comes to Strasbourg again (as it may well) the UK courts will have tested the treaty’s reliability.

The current potential appeal to the Supreme Court is now of academic interest only – and permission’s less likely to be granted than it was a day ago. But when Jordan makes a request for him under this treaty, in my view a decision by Theresa May to surrender him is likely to be sustainable in the courts – and even in Strasbourg.

It’ll be a long road yet, and Theresa May may not be the Home Secretary who sees him board a plane. But today’s announcement is, I suspect, the turning point in this legal saga.

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The Media Reform Coalition has spotted that the current proposals in the Crime and Courts Bill, inserted at the last minute to give statutory backing to the press self-regulation system the main parties have agreed on, may not work properly for small and online publishers, like bloggers. So I’m pleased to say it’s decided to consult them on what they’d like to see from the system.

Media Reform shares my concerns that the current proposals may on the one hand expose far too many blogs to the full “costs penalties” intended to apply to full-scale press operations, while at the same time locking them out of the “costs benefits” or protections offered to the press - even if they choose to be regulated. This could be the worst of both worlds for bloggers – who I think should at the very least benefit from the system, whether they choose self-regulation or not, on equal terms with the press.

The consultation asks who should risk being subject to exemplary damages and costs penalties if unregulated, and (something I think is crucial) whether respondents think the costs protections that flow from joining a self-regulator should be available to anyone who joins, whether or not they are a “relevant publisher” as defined in the current proposals.

It also asks about various options for exempting small blogs and publishers from the definition of “relevant publisher”.

You can read the consultation briefing document below (and you’ll see that I contributed in a small way to its drafting) and you can respond to the consultation here. There’s some urgency about this, as MPs will return to debate the system in two weeks or so.

If you’re a blogger or small publisher, please do respond to the consultation.

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Parliament hasn’t yet published a text of the Crime and Courts Bill taking account of the recent Commons and Lords amendments dealing with press regulation. But seeing the provisions as they stand today may help discussion of the proposed system – which is widely misunderstood. So I’ve put together a version of the press regulation provisions, with what I think must be the current numbering.

There are a couple of things to note.

First, as I say, this takes account of the Lords amendments, agreed this week. They correct a drafting error, take a subsection out of clause 36 and add a paragraph to the Schedule to exempt small-scale blogs. No one should worry too much about the precise wording of paragraph 7A, by the way: it’s only intended as a Parliamentary device to allow the Commons to debate it and replace it with a proper exemption for blogs – it’s not actually intended to be law in itself.

Second, I’ve added a cross-heading above that paragraph – just to help readers identify it. (Actually, I’ve now realised the Lords have proposed putting that cross-heading in. Silly of me.)

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In Monday’s Lords debate about the new press regulation provisions inserted into the Crime and Courts Bill, one line stands out above all. Discussing an amendment about the vicarious liability of publishers, justice minister Lord McNally said (column 876):

the liability of individual journalists at common law remains as it is now.

Although said in the context of a specific amendment, his statement’s true of the provisions as a whole. They do nothing to alter the legal position of an individual journalist (or, for that matter, blogger). It is publishers who will be able to subscribe to a press self-regulator under the terms of the draft Royal Charter; and its is relevant publishers who, under the Crime and Courts Bill, will have costs protection in libel and privacy cases if they subscribe (or can’t reasonably be expected to) and suffer costs penalties and possible exemplary damages if they don’t (and could be reasonably expected to).

At first blush, most people will be comfortable about this. Most assume that the new scheme will simply place burdens on publishers, and are likely to oppose any extension of those burdens to individual journalists. Indeed, I expect some readers to be horrified when I say that writers not only should but must be covered by the new legislation. Let me explain.

As the law stands at the moment, the writer of an article or blogpost – not just its “publisher” – can be sued for libel or misuse of private information. Often, a claimant won’t bother, because it’s the publisher rather than the writer who has money to pay damages. But it can be done.

For example, in relation to her very good book Denying the Holocaust, David Irving sued the author Deborah Lipstadt as well as her publisher Penguin Books. In relation to a newspaper article, Peter Abbey sued the journalist who wrote it, Andrew Gilligan, as well as his publisher, Associated Newspapers. And in relation to a blogpost, Johanna Kaschke sued the blogger who wrote it, John Gray, as well as the editor of the blog that published it, Alex Hilton. As Lord McNally said, the new press legislation will not change this.

If the new provisions came in as drafted, and some aggrieved claimant sued both a publisher and writer for libel, the publisher – at least as long as he, she or it qualified as a “relevant publisher” – would be subject to the new costs provisions. If it did not subscribe to a self-regulator but could reasonably have been expected to do so, then the presumption would be that it should pay the claimant’s costs – win or lose. Equally though, if the publisher did subscribe, or could not reasonably have been expected to (an example might be a foreign publisher or a very small one), the presumption would be that it should not have to pay the claimant’s costs – win or lose.

But what about the writer? He or she would be in the same position they’re in now. They’d pay the claimant’s costs if they lost.

What this means is that a rich claimant could in effect circumvent the protections given by the Crime and Courts Bill to self-regulated and “reasonably unregulated” publishers – simply by suing the writer, as well or instead. They’d no longer be able to threaten a small or self-regulated publisher with the risk of paying heavy legal costs, but they could use that threat against the writer.

If the publisher were a big operation and decided to stand behind its writer, that might be fair enough. But what if it didn’t, or couldn’t? What if the defendant were a group blog (like Labour Home in the Kaschke case), and the publisher didn’t have the means to stand behind the author of the post? A rich, bullying claimant would be in the same strong position they’re in now – even if the blog had signed up for self-regulation. That can’t be right.

The problem can be solved if special provision is made to protect writers. If a claimant wants to make a complaint of libel (say) against an individual writer, he or she should be expected to use the self-regulator’s arbitral service if it’s available because a self-regulated publisher hosted the piece – or a substantially similar piece. I say “substantially similar” to cover the situation where a piece in a newspaper or on a group blog is cross-posted in a slightly edited form on the writer’s own website.

If the claimant ends up going to court anyway, the writer should have the same costs protection as the publisher – even if the publisher isn’t being sued, and whether or not the publisher subscribes to a self-regulator. Only if the publisher was not signed up to regulation but could reasonably have been expected to should the writer be at risk of costs – and even then, only if he or she loses.

If this scheme goes through, it must include special provision for writers. It wouldn’t mean a extension of regulatory burdens, or impinge on free speech. On the contrary, free speech requires it.

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Press regulation: the international aspect

March 26, 2013

An exchange in last night’s Lords debate on the new press regulation clauses in the Crime and Courts Bill revealed a little-noticed – and no doubt to some, astonishing – aspect of the proposed system: it covers foreign publishers. Lord Lucas raised the issue (column 854): I am sure that this is my misreading, but [...]

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Costs protection for regulated publishers in the Crime and Courts Bill: a small analgesic

March 26, 2013

I wrote the other day that I was confused about a new clause inserted into the Crime and Courts Bill, as a result of cross-party agreement on press regulation. As originally drafted it protected regulated publishers from costs awards in libel cases, for instance, if the issues raised by the claim could have been resolved [...]

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Why press regulation should cover blogs

March 24, 2013

In my last post, I said I was worried that the press self-regulation scheme agreed by the main political parties (and to be underpinned by a Royal Charter and two pieces of legislation) would not offer bloggers what it offers the press. Let me explain my worries – and why I think every type of [...]

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The Leveson Royal Charter deal

March 23, 2013

Just before Lord Justice Leveson reported in November, I wrote in support of statutory press regulation: Only legislation can require newspapers to submit even to their own enforcement of their own code … What statute – and no other arrangement – can do is set up a genuinely independent regulator: independent not only of the [...]

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The Winslow Boy

March 22, 2013

Charlie Rowe as Ronnie Winslow | Photo: Nobby Clark Terence Rattigan’s famous play, about a father’s fight for justice for his son, was first staged in London in 1946; and Lindsay Posner’s production at the Old Vic makes you feel you’ve seen it as it might have been presented then. It has a consciously old-fashioned aesthetic, [...]

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Abu Qatada’s bail conditions

March 11, 2013

Abu Qatada’s back in court today – or his lawyers will be, at least, contesting Theresa May’s appeal against the judgment of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission last November, which ruled that she acted unlawfully in not revoking her deportation order against Qatada. The underlying reason was that she could not satisfy SIAC that deportation to Jordan [...]

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