Ed can enter No. 10 without Nicola’s keys

Ministry of Defence | Creative CommonsThis election looks a close-run thing – very close run indeed. As I write, polls and forecasts suggest strongly that no party’s going to get near a majority. There’s a lot of talk about what could happen after May 7th. And an idea’s beginning to take hold that, in a hung Parliament, Ed Miliband would need some sort of advance promise of support from the Scottish Nationalists before the Queen would appoint him Prime Minister.

That, though, is a wrong reading of the constitution. Except by allying with the Conservatives no smaller party – whether the SNP, the Liberal Democrats or even both together – can deny Ed Miliband “the keys to Number 10”. Let me explain.

Under our Parliamentary system, the test for whether a Prime Minister can govern or not is whether he (or she) commands a majority in the House of Commons. Once it’s clear to the Prime Minister that he no longer does so, by convention he should resign. It used to be the case that he had the option of asking the Queen for a general election if he lost the confidence of the House mid-term: that option is now removed by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.

But we’re interested not in the mid-term position: only in the situation immediately following an election. Even before the 2011 Act, by convention the Queen would not have granted a second dissolution of Parliament to a Prime Minister who’d just lost an election a few days or weeks before. On this, the constitution is unchanged. The Prime Minister resigns once it’s clear he no longer commands a majority. That’s what we’re used to seeing happen in the past, when one party lost an election, and the other clearly won it.

This is how it’s explained in one of the leading constitutional law textbooks, Bradley and Ewing (15th edition):

by a long-standing conventional rule, the government must have the confidence of a majority in the Commons. Therefore, when it is clear from election results that the Prime Minister … has lost the election and another party has been successful, he or she must resign immediately without waiting for the new Parliament to meet.

All very simple, when one side losing its majority at the election amounts to the same thing as the other being successfully achieving one. The problem about hung Parliaments is that they can break that equation. The government can lose its majority without anyone else winning one.

So which side of the equation matters then, in constitutional terms?  Is the PM entitled to carry on, even if it’s clear he himself will have no majority, until someone else succeeds in achieving one? Many have I think been misled by the events of 2010 into thinking so. But actually it’s the existing Prime Minister’s loss of a majority that is decisive. It remains the case that by convention he must resign once it’s clear he no longer has one: whether anyone else does is irrelevant.

A vital point to understand is that the duty to resign only arises when it’s clear that the PM’s majority is gone. He’s entitled to carry on as long as he might still have one (as Ted Heath did in February 1974). Ultimately, any uncertainty is resolved in the House of Commons itself. If he seriously thinks he can present his plans and win MPs’ approval for them after the election, David Cameron will be entitled to carry on and test the opinion of the House (as Stanley Baldwin did in 1924). But lose that vote on the Queen’s speech and his moment of clarity, and resignation, will have arrived.

This is the moment at which the “hidden keys” theory would be seen to be correct, or wrong. Would the Queen refuse to appoint Ed Miliband if he had no deal with another party showing his command of a majority? Would the Queen make him wait until he’d done such a deal? Would she allow or require Cameron to carry on regardless? Let’s see what monarchs have done in the past.

In 1924, as I’ve said, Baldwin came back following a general election to test the opinion of the House. At that election, his Conservatives were by some margin the biggest party: he had 258 of the 615 seats. But Labour on 191 and the Liberals with 158 ganged up to vote him down, and forced his resignation. As Nicola Sturgeon might put it, together they “locked Baldwin out of Downing Street”. The King appointed Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the next largest party, without any question of his first having to prove he had a majority of his own. What happened is explained by Professor Rodney Brazier in his excellent book Constitutional Practice. Notice what he says at footnote 26 on page 34:

The National Executive Committee resolved on 12 December 1923 that the “Parliamentary Party should at once accept full responsibility for the Government of the country without compromising itself with any form of coalition”: The Times: 14 December 1923.

MacDonald’s government lasted only nine months. But the example shows that when the PM resigns, the minority leader of the biggest opposition party can expect to be appointed in his place even if he refuses any deal with others. Notice, also, that MacDonald had fewer seats than Baldwin.

In 1929, Baldwin resigned immediately following an election at which his party had won 260 of the 615 seats; again, MacDonald was appointed to lead a minority government, having only won 287 seats. There was no question this time either of his having first to prove he’d secured support from anyone else. His minority government lasted two years before MacDonald split Labour by going into coalition with the Tories.

In February 1974, Ted Heath won only 297 of the 635 seats. He tried to do a deal with the Liberals, who had 14, assuming he could also persuade the 7 Ulster Unionists to back him. But he could reach no agreement with the Liberals, and Heath resigned the Monday after the election. The Queen immediately appointed Harold Wilson to replace him. Wilson had 301 seats – admittedly a few more than Heath.

But it’s important to notice that this fact alone did not mean the Queen summoned him the morning after polling. He was appointed only after Heath resigned, in accordance with convention. And he was appointed in spite of having made clear he sought no deal with any other party. As this contemporary civil service note says,

Mr. Wilson had issued a statement making it clear that he was prepared to form a minority Labour Government but not to enter into any coalition or understanding with other parties in the House.

Yet again, we see that Wilson was appointed as a matter of course, the PM having resigned. His minority government lasted seven months before he won a knife-edge majority that October.

The example that may confuse people is 2010. The fact that Gordon Brown stayed on for five days after the election while the Conservatives and LibDems negotiated has I think given the impression that he resigned, and that a Conservative PM was appointed, only because a coalition deal gave Cameron a majority; that Nick Clegg “held the keys” to Downing Street. But the impression’s misleading, in a significant way. One particular detail is telling: Brown resigned before the coalition deal was struck.

They real “key” to understanding 2010 is to realise that the position of the LibDems, whose talks with both the main parties showed that (at least in theory) they might support either, more or less restored the equation between one side achieving a majority, and the other side realising it had lost one. So long as the LibDems might support him, Brown had the prospect of a majority, or at least being best placed to achieve one. But by the Tuesday, it was clear to him that prospect had gone. Tory-LibDem talks had reached the point where it was clear to Brown (whether Nick Clegg actually sealed the deal with the Tories or not) that he’d lost command of the House. He resigned; and Cameron as leader of the biggest opposition party was summoned as a matter of course.

Having gone through the history, now let’s look at how constitutional experts explain the position. Bradley & Ewing again:

Where the result of the election gives no party an overall majority in the Commons, the Prime Minister may continue in office for as long as is necessary to discover whether he or she is able to form a coalition or to govern with the support of other parties.

Not, you note, until some other combination of forces proves it has a majority.

Brazier says

If the party Leaders were to agree within a few days that a majority coalition could not be formed and that a minority government should take office (as in 1974) the succession question would be decided. The Queen, acting on the views of the party Leaders as published … would perform without controversy her dignified function of receiving the outgoing Prime Minister’s resignation and appointing his minority successor.

All it would take of course for it to be clear no majority coalition could be formed would be for Ed Miliband to refuse one in advance – like both MacDonald and Wilson.

Professor David Feldman puts it this way in his book English Public Law:

If there is a ‘hung’ Parliament, with no party in overall control, the monarch invites first the incumbent Prime Minister to continue in office; if he is unable to do so, then the leader of the largest opposition party is appointed Prime Minister.

This, of course, is precisely the principle I’m arguing for. Feldman cites what was written in a 2004 article in the journal Public Law by Professor Robert Blackburn, who explained

The incumbent Prime Minister has the first opportunity to continue in office and form an administration. If he is unable to do so (and resigns, or is defeated on the Address at the meeting of Parliament), then the leader of the largest opposition party is appointed Prime Minister.

The “Address at the meeting of Parliament” he mentions is the debate on the Queen’s speech. Professor Blackburn puts the same point in a very balanced way as author of the constitutional law section of Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edition, 2014, §204):

a consensus is lacking as to what is the appropriate procedure to be followed if no party commands an overall majority. Some hold that the leader of the largest opposition party should be convention automatically be asked.

He himself holds that position, as we’ve seen; and in a footnote he adds that

This outcome was arrived at, for instance, following the inconclusive general elections of 1924, 1929, February 1974 and 2010.

But what alternative opinion might anyone else “hold”? Professor Blackburn explains that

In its account of existing practice the executive leaves open the possibility of a range of options, though emphasises the idea of political leaders resolving the issue between them and not drawing the monarch into party political decisions.

This “executive account of existing practice” is the Cabinet Manual, which calls itself a “guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of government” and “an authoritative guide for ministers and officials”. So we can assume it represents the advice the Cabinet Secretary will give both the Prime Minister and Buckingham Palace. It says (para 2.8)

Prime Ministers hold office unless and until they resign. If the Prime Minister resigns on behalf of the Government, the Sovereign will invite the person who appears most likely to be able to command the confidence of the House to serve as Prime Minister and to form a government.

It’s worth noting that a person most likely to command a majority is a different thing from a person who’s already shown he can do so. The Cabinet Manual puts it another way in the following paragraph (2.9):

In modern times the convention has been that the Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and if there is doubt it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process, and in particular the parties represented in Parliament, to seek to determine and communicate clearly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons.

Again, the Cabinet Manual avoids suggesting an incoming PM must prove he or she already has a majority; the person appointed will be whoever is best placed to achieve one. That, if David Cameron resigns in May this year, is bound in reality to be Ed Miliband. There’s little if any difference between what Professor Blackburn and the Cabinet Manual each “hold”.

I must just mention the one theoretical circumstance in which Miliband might not be “best placed” if Cameron resigns in May. If it became clear not only that no other party would support Ed, but that MPs were rallying in large numbers behind some other figure, then that person might be best placed to command the House.

Feldman (who, you’ll remember, agrees with Blackburn and with me on the basic principle) covers this situation at a later point in English Public Law:

If in such a situation the incumbent Prime Minister finds that he or she is unable to command a majority in the House … the Queen will invite another person to see if he or she can form a government. This person may be the leader of the largest or next largest party in the House of Commons apart from that of the previously incumbent government. However if another person can command a majority in the House, for instance through a coalition or pact formed from two or more smaller parties, the sovereign may invite that person to form a government.

But who would that person be this May? Nick Clegg? And who’d be his supporters? Even with, say, 30 LibDem MPs, 50 from the SNP, the Greens, Plaid Cymru and all the Northern Irish parties, he’d still need many Tory or Labour defectors to displace Ed from pole position. This is all so far-fetched that it can just be dismissed for practical purposes.

Brazier says (he actually has in mind a coalition between the “outgoing” PM and others, like Ted Heath; but his point could apply in Feldman’s situation) that where a putative coalition has a real claim to have more seats at its disposal than the opposition leader, the Queen should wait to see if it can achieve a “copper-bottomed agreement” before appointing anyone else. But even in that example (in which helpfully for our purposes he casts Labour as the opposition), Brazier says, returning yet again to the fundamental principle I’ve been arguing for, that

If after the party negotiations no such copper-bottomed coalition agreement were to prove possible, the Queen should accept the outgoing Prime Minister’s resignation and appoint the leader of the Labour Party as minority Prime Minister.

If it becomes clear after May 7th that David Cameron no longer commands a majority and cannot continue in office, then in accordance with convention he’ll resign; and all precedent, all expert opinion and the Cabinet manual itself tell us the leader of the largest opposition party will be appointed Prime Minister. Miliband won’t first need to ask Sturgeon to go looking in her handbag.

How long his government could survive is a separate question.

My e-book What a Fix-Up! tells you everything you need to know about the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. Read about it here, and buy it here.

2015-05-06T21:26:01+00:00Tags: , , |

The Prince Charles letters judgment – in a few sentences

For a while I’ve wondered if it might be helpful to summarise key Supreme Court and other major judgments in a few sentences. So I thought I’d have a go at it as an experiment, while I’m gathering my fuller thoughts on today’s Supreme Court judgment.

Here, then, is my effort at a bite-sized summary of the legal reasoning behind today’s judgment. The first paragraph contains the key reasoning explaining why disclosure was ordered (which as you can see, was not consistent even among the majority on the court). The second paragraph is an important secondary piece of reasoning which helps you understand the case fully. On that, a bigger majority’s reasoning is consistent.

Vetoing release of the letters was unlawful [5-2 against the government], either because the veto power in the Act is very restricted, not spelling out as clearly as the constitutional principle of legality requires that ministers can veto just because they disagree reasonably with the Upper Tribunal about the public interest (Lords Neuberger, Kerr and Reed); or because it requires more detailed explanation than the Attorney General gave of why he says the Upper Tribunal was wrong to order disclosure (Lord Mance and Lady Hale).
Anyway, the veto power can’t be used to block release of letters about the environment because it negates the binding judicial decision on disclosure which the EU Environmental Directive requires (all 5 of those Justices, plus Lord Hughes) [6-1 against the government].

For law students and others interested in the technicalities, the ratio of this case is hard to identify because the majority doesn’t share common reasoning. The best I can say to identify the ratio is that the veto power is much more limited than it appears to be on its face, either in terms of when or how it can be used.

Because it’s a back-up, the point about the EU Directive is obiter: it doesn’t create binding precedent. But it’s pretty hard to argue with. I’m quite surprised there was any dissent about it.

You want the dissent? You want to see the dissent in a sentence or two? Okay.

It’s perfectly clear from the Act that Parliament intended the veto to be available where ministers reasonably disagree with the Upper Tribunal about the public interest in disclosure. The veto was reasonable, so that’s that. It was lawful. (Lords Hughes and Wilson).
The veto power doesn’t breach the EU Directive either, because judicial review of the reasonableness of the veto is enough to amount to the required judicial decision on disclosure. (Lord Wilson).

If this is useful, I’ll do it again in future.

Anonymity for rape suspects: my piece for Independent Voices

Today the Commons Home Affairs Select Committee published a report following its short inquiry into police bail. As part of that report the committee recommended that, just as those who say they’ve been the victim of a sexual offence enjoy anonymity,

the same right to anonymity should also apply to the person accused of the crime, unless and until they are charged with an offence.

In response I’ve written a piece for Independent Voices. As well as opposing this idea on principle (I think it relies on wrong-headed ideas about the presumption of innocence and fairness) what struck me when writing this was how often it’s MPs themselves who keep resurrecting this debate, and how superficial their approach to it is when they raise it:

It’s worth noticing how lightly MPs have dealt with this over the years. They knew better than Dame Rose Heilbron in the Seventies, and many of them knew better than the Criminal Law Revision Committee in the Eighties. The Coalition knew better than its own manifestoes, and the Home Affairs committee knows better today, though it only heard from five witnesses – and spoke to them mainly about police bail, in fact. MPs simply don’t approach this issue with the seriousness it deserves.

I hope you’ll read the whole piece.

2015-03-20T19:33:43+00:00Tags: , |

Britain’s got its way on prisoners’ votes – so why withdraw from the ECHR?

February 11 2015

Diamond Geezer | Creative Commons

In yesterday’s judgment on 1,015 “legacy” applications, the European Court of Human Rights ruled once again that the legislative bar on prisoners’ voting breaches article 3 of the first protocol to the European Convention. That result was predictable given the Court’s case law on votes for prisoners.

But more importantly, the Court awarded none of these successful applicants a penny in damages; and not a penny in costs, either. The Court has drawn a line under its dispute with the UK, and will do nothing further to raise the stakes.

We’ve known for a long time that there were hundreds if not thousands of applications by prisoners, piggy-backing on John Hirst’s successful complaint over ten years ago now. These cases were stayed for a time, following the Greens & MT “pilot judgment” against the UK in 2010, in which the Court said explicitly that UK law must change. But they were later revived, Parliament still not having legislated.

The fact that so many claims have been outstanding led many in the media to speculate about the huge sums we might have to pay, £160 million being mentioned at one stage (and debunked by Adam Wagner at the UK Human Rights Blog). These sums were plucked out of the air, often combined with the factoid that the Court could fine the UK – which it can’t. What it can do is compensate applicants (a very different matter, since it allows for no punitive element) and award them legal costs. I think the figures bandied about may have originated from a fag-packet reckoning by John Hirst himself, though I don’t complain against him: he was campaigning, so it was fair enough to argue about how much this “could” cost.

But the total bill from these 1000+ cases amounts to £0.00. Fears of the fiscal impact of this dispute were exaggerated. George Osborne and the Office for Budget Responsibility need not revise their deficit forecasts.

Yes, some cases remain, including more that relate to European elections and some about the Scottish referendum. But it’s hard to see how prisoners can hope to be awarded damages or costs, even if they win. The same must go for any leftover claims about Westminster Parliament votes.

In truth, it’s hard to see how the European Court could ever have upped the ante with the UK. It’s doubtful that its powers are wide enough. So to call this a Strasbourg surrender would go too far. But choosing to award neither damages nor (and this is the telling point) any legal costs means the Court is washing its hands of this, and wants no more cases added to its backlog. The message to prisoners and their lawyers is clear: apply, and you’ll have a symbolic win. There’s no cash in it.

Abu Qatada is abroad; our courts can impose whole-life orders; and Britain’s continuing failure to give prisoners the vote is cost-free. It’s now simply a diplomatic issue for the Council of Europe’s committee of ministers, who must know this is not the worst case of non-implementation, and are unlikely to take drastic action.

The “dialogue” approach pursued by Dominic Grieve when he was Attorney General and supported by an increasing number of our own judges in recent years, has succeeded. British pushback and the 2012 Brighton reforms have changed the weather in Strasbourg, where the Court is showing a new restraint – arguably excessive restraint in some cases, leading to confused rulings like the one about the niqab ban in France. But it’s a restraint that will be welcome in Britain.

What should we make now, then, of Conservative plans to make Strasbourg judgments “merely advisory” or else pull out of the human rights convention entirely? Those plans are yesterday’s solution to yesterday’s problem, with nothing to support them save the odd grumble about deporting a foreign criminal – and the hot air generated by UKIP.

2015-05-11T12:29:29+00:00Tags: |

John Cooper QC on the Global Law Summit: “By going there, we are tacitly endorsing what Grayling is doing”

January 26 2015


The Criminal Bar Association’s acceptance of an invitation to speak at the government’s Global Law Summit next month is “pandering” to the Lord Chancellor’s “political opportunism”, John Cooper QC said today in an interview for this website.

going to this jamboree in my opinion is copping out

said the leading criminal barrister.

We should not be attending an event in my opinion which is simply a political tool by this Lord Chancellor to make him and the government look good on the eve of a general election … by going there, we are tacitly endorsing what Grayling is doing to the criminal justice system.

The criminal bar should, he said

be seen not to be pandering to that political opportunism.

In a wide-ranging interview, John Cooper also spoke about Sir Brian Leveson’s proposals for improving the efficiency of criminal justice, the DPP’s consultation on supporting victims in the trial process, and recent criticism of a Crown Court judge who said a former teacher convicted of having sex with a pupil had been “groomed” by the girl.

On the Leveson proposal to limit defendants’ right to choose jury trial, he said

jury trial’s already under threat, and we need to be very careful about this development … what one person might call trivial or low level … could well be important to you and I.

John Cooper surprised me by saying he’d changed his mind, over time, on the role of victims in the criminal justice system. Earlier in his career, he said

I was thinking in a straitjacket

but in what might

sound like a slap in the face to the fundamentalists

he said we need to think about increasing the role of victims in criminal trials. And he said he was open-minded about extending the Attorney General’s power to refer unduly lenient sentences to the Court of Appeal.

We also spoke briefly about Saudi justice and our government’s involvement with it.

You can listen to the whole interview here, or follow the links if you’d like to listen to just one section of the interview. You can find all the clips at Soundcloud.

Dominic Grieve: I am not a lone voice crying in the wilderness

December 4 2014


The Conservative debate on human rights is “very far from over”, Dominic Grieve told an audience of lawyers last night, as he strongly criticised his party’s recent policy paper – saying he was not sure a key aspect of it “was really intended as a serious proposal”. There are “plenty” of Conservative supporters of human rights, he claimed, and he said they will win the internal debate – but “must not stay silent”.

He was giving a lecture organised by the the Judicial Institute and the Constitution Unit at UCL under the title Why it matters that Conservatives should support the ECHR. Here’s the full draft text to which he spoke.

Attitudes to human rights among Conservatives, Grieve began,

are more complex and often more nuanced than the reading of a tabloid newspaper might suggest.

There is much that remains undebated and misunderstood about both the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights, he said. The ECHR and its application in our law through the HRA is, he said, of enormous benefit to our country and our collective wellbeing.

The politician in me is determined that this argument can and must be made with some passion because I believe it goes to the heart of our identity as a nation and of our national interest.

The rights originally protected under the Convention were, he said (though like Dinah Rose QC, in her recent lecture, he saw the article 8 right to respect for private life as the exception)

a classic exposition of the “liberties” which successive generations of British politicians and the British public generally have insisted are our shared inheritance. How well they were in practice maintained through the centuries however is very questionable; there have been plenty of examples of their violation. But they are part of an entirely distinctive national narrative … This national narrative has been so powerful that it’s acted as a an almost mythic restraint on successive British governments trying to curb freedoms

But the ECHR has created its own dynamic:

By converting liberties to rights it’s facilitated their ownership and assertion by individuals, rather than their mere invocation as abstract principles against administrative or policy decisions. The anger of the tabloid press at undeserving claims is the inevitable corollary that claims by the deserving can now be made.

He put Britain’s acceptance of the ECHR in a broad foreign policy context:

It has been the intention and policy of successive UK governments over the last two centuries to seek to make the world a less dangerous, more predictable and better place by encouraging the creation of international agreements governing the behaviour of states.

Since the adherence of so many states that had been previously governed by Communist tyranny, he said,

the Convention and the Strasbourg court have been instrumental in facilitating the creation of the rule of law in environments where it had never previously existed … For all its problems, the Convention has proved and is proving to be an effective tool – perhaps the single and most cost-effective one currently available for promoting human rights on our planet.

Citing criticism of the Strasbourg Court by British judges, Grieve said

I think these criticisms are valid. The Strasbourg court … has sometimes micromanaged the Convention too much and sought to impose a uniformity of practice that is not desirable … The problem caused by the Court’s decision on prisoner voting in the case of Hirst is for me a good illustration. In itself the issue is largely symbolic: the question of whether or not convicted and sentenced prisoners should have the vote is of very little practical consequence. But symbols can matter in the context of parliamentary democracy and the judgment in my opinion was an unnecessary interference with a policy that enjoys overwhelming parliamentary support and cannot I believe be categorised as a substantial interference with a human right. I am sorry that I wasn’t able to get it fully reversed when I intervened in the case of Scoppola v Italy on the same point.

But I have to say that as a lawyer this is, regrettably perhaps, not the first time I’ve disagreed with a court decision in a case in which I have appeared.

And in a number of key cases involving this country, the court has made adverse findings which an overwhelming majority would now say were correct, Grieve added.

I have never been lobbied by a single colleague on the grounds that S and Marper v UK in which the Strasbourg Court held that the UK policy in England and Wales of the indefinite retention of DNA and fingerprint profiles of acquitted individuals (the only jurisdiction in Europe to do this I might add) was unjustified – never has it been suggested to me that that was wrongly decided.

Grieve mentioned what he saw as positive changes in recent years. Emphasising a point he made recently at Gray’s Inn, he said the government might have achieved more reform of the Strasbourg system at the Brighton Conference in 2012

and actually changed the text of the Convention itself, if our fellow signatory governments with which we negotiated, and who shared our goals, had not been deterred by their domestic NGOs from full co-operation with our agenda, because of a fear that we wished to diminish the Court’s effectiveness. This was a mistaken fear then, but I have to accept the most recent Conservative Party paper is going to make further progress on this harder.

While it was too early to tell if the Brighton reforms would achieve all that was intended, Grieve said “there are signs we were going in the right direction”. He also welcomed the fact that

the important shift by our own national courts away from the principles in Ullah defining the requirement of “take account of” as being the close mirroring of Strasbourg decisions, has initiated a dialogue that has led to a number of cases in which the Strasbourg Court has shown deference to the reasoning of our own … Proactivity by our own judges pays jurisprudential dividends.

Turning to the recent Conservative policy paper on human rights, Grieve said

I am struck by the paucity of concrete examples of Strasbourg mission creep that are identified, to justify a case for change.

He dismissed as of little or no real impact the Dickson case about artificial insemination and prisoners, and the need for a review in the context of “whole life orders” following the Vinter case:

as was made clear by the Court of Appeal in the case of McLoughlin, such a review mechanism has always existed and has to be operated compatibly with Convention rights by the Justice Secretary or risk judicial review. At present therefore, this example of mission creep is hypothetical and of absolutely no practical effect.

Grieve agreed that Article 8 has been invoked too often to try to justify foreign criminals escaping deportation at the end of their sentences.

But this has … a lot more to do with the failure of the UK Borders Act 2007 to address this issue as intended. That was why Parliament has recently enacted the Immigration Act 2014. It’s intended to be compatible with our adherence to the Convention … If it works and in introducing it the Government believed it would, it’s difficult to see how the proposal in the paper which promises to put the text of the Convention into new primary legislation would improve matters at all.

He pulled apart other specific proposals, in particular the idea that the courts should disapply rights in “trivial” cases:

Such an exercise is likely to prove  difficult and fruitless. It will still have to be subject to judicial interpretation, and I think it will add to and not reduce litigation. The courts of our country have well tested processes for preventing abusive claims taking up time and cost.

The paper overall would put our relationship with the Convention in question, he said, as

it is impossible to see that the proposed Bill of Rights can be compatible with it – entirely different from the position which my Party adopted in its manifesto when promoting a Bill of Rights in 2010.

The consequences of this are likely, he said, to be devastating domestically and for the future of the Convention.

Domestically, our non-compliance with the Convention calls into question the devolution settlements for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland which enshrine Convention rights as governing all their actions … At a time when the future of the United Kingdom is still in question and I have to say the peace settlement in Northern Ireland still fragile, it opens the prospect of a new area of political discord, quite apart from the possibility of our courts having – or the Supreme Court having – to operate different rights systems in one country. For a Unionist party this seem to me to be a very odd thing to do.

He warned of trying to leap out of an ECHR frying pan into an EU fire:

At present the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg is confined to applying the Convention as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights only to matters within EU competence. But it has, as I know from my time as Attorney General, been notably expansive in this respect; and it has properly been a goal of government policy – successive government policy – to try to limit this trend … But I really can’t think of anything more likely to accelerate this trend than claims being brought before the European Court of Justice by persons who consider that they are being denied access to Convention Rights, and that they can get no redress either domestically or through the Strasbourg court – because we’re treating judgments there as merely advisory. The likely consequence must be that as long as we remain in the EU, the European Court of Justice will expand its jurisprudence to give redress and of course its judgments will then have direct effect here against the government of the United Kingdom.

Grieve seemed clear that the policy paper would lead the UK to withdrawal from the ECHR:

it is inconceivable that we can negotiate a special status for ourselves within it

he said. The UK’s ambivalence about the Convention

flies in the face of all the good work done internationally by the United Kingdom government to promote human rights for so long – and I should explain, being done on a day-to-day basis by the foreign office and DfID at this very moment. I have to say that as a Conservative this pains me. Whatever the challenges the Convention has posed and I accept that there are some proper grounds to criticise its operation, the failure of ambition represented in the paper and the narrowness of its moral and political vision is, frankly, very disappointing.

Grieve remained politically optimistic, though, about a Conservative debate he saw as have been opened rather than closed by the policy paper:

The debate on which my Party is now embarked is one that I believe need not lead to our withdrawal from the Convention or such an adverse outcome for human rights or our national interest … those of us in the Party who see the maintenance and promotion of an international system of human rights as being in the national interest and entirely in keeping with a Conservative tradition of freedom under the law, will win that argument for the reasons I’ve tried to set out this evening – but we must not stay silent.

Following his lecture, and in response to a question Joshua Rozenberg, Grieve said

we’re never going to be able to negotiate this “advisory status” – this is fantasyland. It would destroy the Convention to have the United Kingdom with some special status, so I think we would have to leave.

But he thought the policy paper actually conceded quite a bit to his way of thinking:

I’m interested that, in considering a Bill of Rights, it is the intention to take the Convention text and incorporate it into the Bill … the mere fact that that has been accepted is an indication to me that the Convention has actually become quite well embedded.

He said that when you analysed closely the complaints made against the Convention, they were really quite detailed detailed quibbles, and

when you start to do the cost-benefit analysis between pulling out … wrecking our adherence to the Convention at precisely a time when I happen to think the Convention is shifting in Strasbourg interpretation – it’s not the first time that UK political parties or governments … start to clutch defeat from the jaws of victory; it’s quite a customary occupation of this country – I think they may start to conclude that perhaps actually there might be a better way of doing this.

He said he is

quietly optimistic that this is an argument that is very, very far from over, and indeed seeing that this is the opening shot of the argument from those who want this very profound change it doesn’t seem to me that they’ve made it a very compelling one.

In answer to a question about prisoners’ votes Grieve made this point, related to his ideas about “dialogue” between courts:

It’s very unfortunate actually that Hirst never went to the House of Lords. Because it was never considered at the top end. It was a Divisional Court case it was thought to be so straightforward and clear that there was no ground for taking it further. I somehow think if we had a House of Lords judgment, I rather wonder whether in fact the judgment in 2005 would have been the same.

Asked by me what form of agreement the Conservative policymakers might hope to obtain from Strasbourg – a resolution or public statement perhaps – Grieve gave this remarkable answer:

I have to say, when I read the paper I thought that the author was probably telling a sort of private joke. It had that slight element of it … I’m not sure whether this was really intended as a serious proposal, as opposed to a fig leaf … they didn’t want to say they wanted – were going to – pull out; they wanted some sort of accommodation. I have to be blunt about it: I think that is the likely truth, because it doesn’t bear, I think, close scrutiny … I think somebody was just trying to say “there’ll be a negotiation”, because it just glossed this difficult issue which may, interestingly, not just be for public consumption, but for Conservative consumption as well. Which is why I say I have this quiet optimism.

Asked how believers in human rights could vote Conservative, Grieve said Labour, although it had complied with the Convention

did also do a number of other things which made my hair stand on end,

identity cards being the example he gave. It was not right, he suggested, to think his side had lost the argument among Conservatives:

This is an ongoing debate, as I see it, and … if you are a believer in human rights there are plenty of people who support the HRA and ECHR who are members of the Conservative party, quite a few of them in Parliament. I am not a lone voice crying in the wilderness.

Responding to a question about whether withdrawal from the Convention would necessarily mean the UK had also to leave the EU, he replied that

it may be a matter more of practical reality rather than theory, and that is that it would be all right, or could be tolerated, until there was a breach of the Convention, or a serious failure to observe a Convention norm as determined by the Strasbourg court. But it’s not a place where we ought to be.

He reaffirmed his support for the previous, 2010 version of his party’s “British Bill of Rights” policy:

Such a Bill of Rights might have some real practical benefits, indeed it was advocated back in the early 90s when the question of incorporation was first being considered. It would allow us to create perhaps a more distinctively national document which could also protect some other rights which aren’t protected in the convention at all, things like the right to trial by jury for example. It could even become  – I don’t think we want a written constitution – but it could even become a sort of defining document about some of the ways in which we do things … you could incorporate into it the question of when we hold elections for example … that might have a greater register with people because it would make them realise this was something very much within our national tradition, and not a foreign document.

Grieve was to say the least realistic about the electoral importance of all this:

quite frankly I don’t think that on the doorstep at the next general election, the question of our membership or otherwise of the ECHR is going to be a burning issue at all, I really don’t.

Grieve is an interesting figure politically, as well as legally. A loyal and mainstream Conservative, he made clear last night his agreement with party policy, including on the EU – on which he can clearly live comfortably with David Cameron’s approach as it is currently – while differing on human rights alone. On that, he seems determined to prise open an argument others may think is over, and feels those like him can persuade his party back to a more traditional rule-of-law position, in which foreign policy and home policy make sense together. How far he is capable of swaying Tory opinion, and whether his optimism is misplaced – time will tell.

2014-12-04T16:54:58+00:00Tags: , , |

The PM’s “foreign fighters” plan: probably lawful

November 14 2014

Chris Fleming | Creative CommonsOvernight in Australia, the Prime Minister announced new counter-terrorism powers which he intends to introduce in a bill in the next few weeks. He said there’d be

New powers for police at ports to seize passports, to stop suspects travelling and to stop British nationals returning to the UK unless they do so on our terms.

Perhaps because in September, at an earlier stage of work on this proposal, the Prime Minister has in the past referred to a version of this idea by saying

what we need is a targeted, discretionary power to allow us to exclude British nationals from the UK

or perhaps because No. 10 is calling the new power a “temporary exclusion order”, some media reports are focusing only on the “exclusion” element of the plan, and thinking Britons would be entirely prevented from returning here for two years.

This Channel 4 report for instance gives the impression British citizens would be “banned” from entering the UK, and this piece in the Independent suggests they’d be barred for two years, as does the headline on this Newsweek piece. These confusions may arise from the government’s attempts to make the new powers sound as tough and exclusionary as possible.

If that were the plan, it might indeed fall foul both of international law on statelessness, and on our own domestic law: British citizens have a right of abode in the UK, which includes the right to return here from abroad. I think this confusion that may be driving some early criticisms of the proposal.

But I don’t think it is the plan at all. Like Dominic Grieve, I understand the proposal as involving no “ban” on return at all – merely a ban on what might be called an unarranged return. Those UK citizens subject to “temporary exclusion orders” would be free to come home at any time, by arrangement with British authorities. A Downing Street spokesman confirmed my understanding this afternoon. This is how the plan is meant to work.

If the Home Secretary reasonably suspected someone of involvement in terrorist activity abroad, she could make a temporary exclusion order against him. That would cancel his passport, and put him on a “no-fly” list. As a result it would difficult for him to return to the UK under his own steam. He might be able to cross borders in the Middle East, but could not board a flight to London from Ankara or Istanbul. The order would last for two years.

But if I lost my passport abroad, I’d go to the British consulate – and so could the “excluded” person, if he wanted to go home during the two-year period. He’d be free to come back, by arrangement: perhaps under a restricted travel document allowing him only to board a pre-arranged flight; in all likelihood being escorted by officials of a more or less shadowy sort; and no doubt having a kind of official reception on landing. Once here, he could be arrested for a suspected offence or be subject to a “TPIM” (a terrorism prevention and investigation measure). Or the temporary exclusion order itself might impose separate conditions on him.

I think what’s intended is analogous in a way to the “three walled prison” the Labour government built round foreign terror suspects at Belmarsh a decade or so ago. If you remember, those were people who could not lawfully be deported, so were detained indefinitely – unless they volunteered to return home, in which case they were free to go. It was a plan ruled incompatible with human rights by the House of Lords in “the Belmarsh case”, A v Home Secretary, in 2004, because a disproportionate interference with liberty, and because it discriminated against foreign nationals.

Rather than a three-walled prison, a temporary exclusion order would be an “open funnel” back to the UK. A person subject to one would be free to come home at any time; it’s just that he’d be funnelled back here by a particular route. Yes, he’d be stuck if he was determined not to come back in that way (and the temporary exclusion order would be renewable, by the way). But he’d be stuck only in the same sense as someone who refused ever to go through customs; or who refused ever to fly in any plane, go on any boat and enter any tunnel. That person would have to remain abroad – but not because of any ban.

So this would neither strip terror suspects of British citizenship, not render them practically stateless nor, as Liberty has put it, “dump” them on other countries. The UK would not be refusing to accept them, or refusing to cooperate in their return to the UK. So I don’t think the proposal runs into international law problems.

While article 12.4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR) says

No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country

that is not what the proposals would do.

Nor do I think there’s a domestic law issue. British citizens have the “right of abode” in the UK which, as section 1(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 makes clear, includes the right to leave the UK and come back:

All those who are in this Act expressed to have the right of abode in the United Kingdom shall be free to live in, and to come and go into and from, the United Kingdom without let or hindrance except such as may be required under and in accordance with this Act to enable their right to be established or as may be otherwise lawfully imposed on any person.

As you can see from this provision, the right to come into the UK is not unconditional: there is no absolute right to enter “without let or hindrance”. The right is to enter without let or hindrance except such as may be … lawfully imposed on any person. The government’s argument would be (and I think it’s a good one) that a temporary exclusion order would impose a hindrance on entry into the UK; and that the hindrance would be lawfully imposed under the legislation empowering the Home Secretary to make such orders.

Could there be a human rights problem? I doubt there’s an insurmountable one. A temporary exclusion order would not interfere with a suspect’s right to respect for family life, for instance: it would not stop him from coming back to be with his family in Britain. And even if I’m wrong about that, the article 8 right to family life is not unqualified, and whatever interference there might be with it could surely be defended as proportionate in national security terms.

There could be a breach of the right to a fair hearing, if there were no way of challenging a temporary exclusion order. But I’d be surprised if the legislation precludes a legal challenge. Since article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights permits detention on suspicion of an offence, to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law and to prevent someone effecting an unauthorized entry into the country, arrest and detention of an “excludee” on landing in the UK (who would by definition by suspected of a terrorism offence, at least by the Home Secretary) would probably be legally defensible where it was necessary.

The temporary exclusion order would not in itself interfere with liberty – at least, I’d be very surprised if a court said so – and even if it did, it would surely do so proportionately. Nor is there any question here of discrimination against Britons. So I don’t think this proposal is as vulnerable as the old three-walled prison.

As a matter of interest, Britain has not ratified Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights, article 3.2 of which says

No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national.

But even if we had ratified, it, this provision would not be breached any more than article 12 of the ICCPR would.

I can just about imagine an argument that EU law gets in the way of the proposal. But a British citizen trying to travel home from from Syria or Turkey would not be a national of another member state exercising free movement rights, and so would not fall within the EU citizens’ free movement directive (see article 3.2); and even as a UK citizen, coming back from fighting Turkey as opposed to a job in France, say, he would not be exercising Surinder Singh-type reverse free movement rights when coming back. So EU law’s unlikely to help him.

Of course we don’t know the detail of the proposal yet; there may be some devil in it. But on what we do know, I think the government’s on defensible legal ground.

Grieve: Counter-terrorism measures “probably getting to the right place”

November 14 2014

The former Attorney General Dominic Grieve appeared on Radio 4’s World at One Today to discuss the government’s new plan to “regulate” the return to the UK of those who, for instance, have gone to Syria to fight for the “Islamic State”.

Grieve said his impression was that the new proposals – announced by the Prime Minister overnight in a speech to the Australian Parliament – do not seem aimed at “banning” UK citizens from returning to the UK, which they have a legal right to do, and which would risk breaching international law by making them stateless.

My understanding of the proposals is the same as Grieve’s: the plan is to force people to arrange their return to the UK with British authorities, rather than in any sense to “ban” them from coming back. On that basis, I think there’s a good chance the new regime would be legally defensible.

Phillips, Schiemann, Edward, Jacobs and others: “There is no credible alternative to the European arrest warrant”

November 6 2014

In a letter published in today’s Telegraph, half a dozen senior retired judges call for Britain to “opt back in” to the European Arrest Warrant system. Parliament is expected to vote next week on the government’s proposal to remain in the EAW system and other key European justice measures.

The letter’s signed by the former Supreme Court President Lord Phillips together with two of Britain’s former judges of the European Court of Justice, Sir Konrad Schiemann and Sir David Edward; the former British Advocate General of the ECJ, Sir Francis Jacobs; and retired Court of Appeal judges Sir Henry Brooke and Sir Anthony Hooper. They are joined by a couple of dozen leading barristers and solicitors, former senior police and political figures including the former Home Secretary Charles Clarke and the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation Lord Carlile QC, as well as leading legal academics.

Without the European arrest warrant, they say,

other EU members may be unable speedily to extradite suspects like Hussain Osman or Jeremy Forrest to Britain – both in jail after use of the EAW.

They warn that Britain also risks becoming a safe haven for fugitives from justice,

a handful of them British citizens, but the vast majority foreign nationals wanted for crimes elsewhere in Europe.

The letter cites recent statutory changes it says should help prevent long pre-trial detention, and prevent European arrest warrants being used to pursue minor offences. It argues that Britain can only lead reform of EU criminal justice legislation by being part of the system.

There is no credible alternative to the EAW … Resort to international law on extradition would be slow and ineffective.

I strongly support the case made in the letter. The government would be mad to withdraw from the European arrest warrant which, while (like other laws) imperfect, is the best system yet devised for ensuring criminal suspects face justice regardless of European borders.

Unless Britain wishes to be wholly unable to secure the return of British fugitives from abroad and to extradite foreign suspects from our shores, some form of international cooperation is necessary whether under the EAW or the European Convention on Extradition that preceded it. And if you’re going to cooperate with other countries in this field, you might as well adopt the best, simplest and quickest system, rather than revert to the less satisfactory, slower yet equally “European” arrangements that went before.

Fortunately, Labour MPs’ votes are likely to ensure Britain sensibly stays within the system in spite of a significant Tory backbench rebellion. What can these Conservatives be thinking? Aren’t they the same Eurosceptics who hate the way Abu Qatada delayed his departure to face trial in Jordan? Who think foreign criminals should be removed from the UK as speedily as possible? And who detest the idea that EU migrants have rights to stay here regardless of their alleged conduct?

Why on earth do they of all people want, by withdrawing from the EAW, to give EU suspects more legal rights than they already have, and new opportunities to appeal and delay being sent abroad to face justice? It’s beyond me.

2014-11-06T11:27:55+00:00

Dinah Rose QC: the Conservative human rights paper is “just so rubbish”

October 29 2014

Human Rights Act 3The Conservative party’s plan for a British Bill of Rights is “rubbish”, the leading public law and human rights barrister Dinah Rose QC said last night. She was answering questions after her lecture, entitled “What’s the Point of the Human Rights Act?” at an event in central London organised by the conservative think-tank, Politeia.

In response to Joshua Rozenberg, the Blackstone Chambers silk said

What’s so tragic about the Conservative policy paper is – it’s just so rubbish.

The paper shows, she said,

no sensitivity to or awareness of the difference between public international law and domestic law

and she went on to call the paper

so damn stupid.

Dinah Rose began her lecture with the famous 18th century case of James Somerset.

Somerset’s Case is one of the earliest articulations of what is now known as the principle of legality: the notion that fundamental rights have an inherent force at common law. Such rights cannot be interfered with except by clear, positive law, authorising the interference.

The concept of fundamental common law rights, she said, is spelt out in Blackstone’s Commentaries, and in the eighteenth century British enforcement of rights was a source of pride:

The Sublime Society of Beefsteaks, with its slogan “Beef and liberty” pretty much summed it up: liberty, and fundamental rights, were British values: as British as roast beef itself.

Yet in recent times

the Human Rights Act (though in substance a relative success) has been in public relations terms pretty much of a disaster for our civil liberties. Rights … are now popularly regarded as a foreign imposition, beneficial only to foreigners and criminals.

Given our own tradition of common law fundamental rights, Rose asked,

do we need the Human Right Act and the Convention at all? And if so, why?

I would suggest there are two main reasons in principle why we might need the Convention and the Human Rights Act. The first is because there might be some gap in the scope of the substantive rights protected under our own common law, which could only be filled by reference to the Convention.  The second is that the Convention and the Human Rights Act offer a constitutional framework for the enforcement of rights which would otherwise be lacking in order to ensure their effective protection.

While the common law has done much to protect freedom of expression, liberty, open justice and access to courts, Rose said, that’s not the case with the article 8 Convention right to respect for private life.

I wonder whether one of the reasons why article 8 has been so difficult for the press and the public in Britain to accept is that it never was recognised as a common law right, and unlike virtually all the other rights in the Convention, it actually is, in some sense, an alien imposition. Of course the situation isn’t helped by the fact that article 8 has also been the subject of some of the most creative law making on the part of the Strasbourg court.

How, she wondered, might courts protect human rights if there were no Human Rights Act? It’s possible, she said, that the common law might develop further to fill the gap:

If Parliament were to legislate to abolish all judicial review entirely (which is obviously quite a temptation for the current Secretary of State for Justice) … the courts might either interpret the legislation so strictly as to deprive it of any meaningful effect or even, much more radically, it’s possible that they might conclude that Parliament had no power to enact legislation to abolish the courts.

But such hypothetical cases are extreme. In the more usual case where Parliament has legislated in a manner which appears to restrict a fundamental right, the courts will apply the principle of legality: the very same principle that was applied by Lord Mansfield in Somerset’s Case.

She said the classic modern articulation of this principle of legality is that of Lord Hoffmann in R v Home Secretary ex parte Simms in 2000, and that there’s potential for the principle of legality to develop,

particularly in circumstances in which there is no other effective mechanism for protecting fundamental rights; and especially if Parliament were to enact legislation that blatantly violated a fundamental right (for example, authorising the deportation of an individual to a country where they faced a real risk of torture).

There is, she said, a delicate balance between the powers and functions of the government, Parliament and the courts, which the courts must respect. But

in order for our uncodified constitution to work effectively, it is equally necessary that Parliament and the executive also appreciate and seek to maintain that delicate balance. They must also give proper respect to the role and functions of the courts, and to the rule of law.

Rose criticised ministers’ recent “unfortunate practice” of spinning unwelcome court rulings and attacking judges, specifically mentioning David Cameron’s remark that the idea of giving prisoners the vote makes him “physically sick”.

This sort of reaction matters. It corrodes respect for the courts and the legal process amongst the public, if the government abuses or attacks the judges. This sort of reaction by government to adverse judgments, picked up enthusiastically by the press, is one of the major reasons for the collapse of public regard and respect for the Human Rights Act.

Referring to Monday evening’s defeats for the government in the House of Lords on proposed judicial review reforms – the government is attempting to limit judicial discretion in a number of areas, including to deter charities and campaign groups from intervening in judicial review cases by imposing more directive rules on costs – she said

it is unconstitutional in the true sense of the word for Parliament to seek by primary legislation of this type to fetter the discretion of a court when it’s managing the hearing of a challenge to a government decision. Matters such as the payment of costs should be left to the court which is hearing the case. They should not be micromanaged by the state.

At the end of her lecture, Rose turned specifically to the Conservative plans for a British Bill of Rights:

The policy document in which these proposals was published was unsophisticated, and contained a number of obvious legal errors.

Conservatives, she concluded

ought first of all to be in the business of conserving what is valuable in our traditions. Our fundamental rights and freedoms, and the operation of our common law system which protects them, are foremost amongst those values. But if the government does not understand or respect the system, the risks of doing irreparable damage will be unacceptably high.

In questions following the lecture, Rose told the prominent UKIP supporter Stuart Wheeler (who asked about the European Arrest Warrant) that yes – the EAW system is compatible with the Human Rights Act. He seemed initially to find that answer hard to believe: “Yes, it’s inconsistent?” he asked. But she assured him that in the Julian Assange case

Lord knows, if there had been a human rights point we would have taken it.

In answer to a later question, she agreed that abandoning the Human Rights Act and falling back on common law might end up, ironically, creating even greater problems for Conservatives than they face now.

There is a risk of the law of unintended consequences … Judges abhor a vacuum. If you take their toys away, they’ll make up new toys.

Dinah Rose’s lecture was important not just because of her criticism of Conservative and government policy, but in particular because of her discussion of the “principle of legality” and its future potential as an alternative means of rights protection in a post-Human Rights Act world.

2014-10-29T10:35:05+00:00
Go to Top